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PRO SE, NO SAY?: THE IMPACT OF
PRESUMPTIVE MEDIATION IN THE NEW YORK
STATE COURT SYSTEM ON SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS
Sarah Konnerth*
In May 2019, the New York State Unified Court System announced its plan
to refer all civil cases to various forms of alternative dispute resolution at
the earliest stage of litigation. The presumptive alternative dispute
resolution initiative aims to decrease costs associated with litigation,
improve case outcomes, and reduce case delays. In the context of mediation,
litigants, both represented and self-represented, may be seated across from
each other at a table to discuss their disputes with the assistance of a neutral
third party. This Note examines mediation and discusses the policy
implications of a presumptive mechanism for pro se parties. In evaluating
the fundamental issues that pro se litigants face while bargaining with
represented adversaries, this Note proposes that the judiciary adopt a sixfactor test and expand limited-scope representation to better ensure pro se
litigants’ access to justice in this alternative dispute resolution forum.
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INTRODUCTION
Picture this: it is the dead of winter and the outside temperature has not
crept past an average low of thirty-one degrees Fahrenheit. Your heat does
not work, no matter how hard your fist bangs the radiator, and you have no
hot water, so forget about washing dishes tonight. You try your super’s
number for the fifth time today, only to hear his voicemail message
suggesting that you leave your name and number at the beep. You know you
have some right to these things. You know those rights are being
disrespected. You decide to sue, but there is another problem: you cannot
afford a lawyer.
After you figure out how to file charges, someone somewhere tells you
that you must go to something called presumptive mediation. You likely
have never heard of it. Maybe a court clerk hands you a brochure or gives
you a five-minute overview of what the process entails: you tell your story,
a person is there to help facilitate conversation, and (hopefully) you get your
heat and hot water back. This sounds simple enough, but then you wonder if
your landlord will be there, and if he will have a lawyer present. You do not
know the law. You have never done this before. What do you do?
If you happen to file a lawsuit in New York State court, this could be your
new reality. From personal injury suits and foreclosures to medical
malpractice claims and contract disputes, a wide array of civil cases will now
be referred to various forms of alternative dispute resolution at the earliest
stage of litigation.1

1. See generally Press Release, Lawrence K. Marks, Chief Admin. Judge, Court System
to Implement Presumptive, Early Alternative Dispute Resolution for Civil Cases (May 14,
2019), https://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2019-05/PR19_09_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MLP-37LE].
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In 2018, 1,341,290 civil lawsuits were filed in New York’s trial courts.2
Of those lawsuits, 462,237 civil suits were filed in the state’s highest trial
court, the New York Supreme Court.3 For those 462,237 suits, it cost
litigants $210 to obtain an index number4 and another $95 for a “Request for
Judicial Intervention.”5 After the discovery phase, it cost a party another $30
to file a Note of Issue6 and an additional $45 to file a motion or crossmotion.7
Public policy favors settlement of legal disputes.8 Absent attorney’s fees
and additional litigation expenses, the numbers above indicate that people
need a forum where they can resolve claims more efficiently and at lower
costs.9 Judges, scholars, and practitioners alike feel that alternative dispute
resolution (ADR), and specifically presumptive mechanisms, can achieve
these goals.10
The Department of Justice (DOJ) studied the benefits of ADR processes
in use from 2013 to 2017.11 Three quarters of cases that were voluntarily
2. This number includes cases filed in the New York State Supreme Court, Civil Court
of the City of New York, city and district courts outside New York City, county courts, Court
of Claims, and Small Claims Assessment Review Program. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT
SYS., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 39 (2018), https://www.nycourts.gov/legacypdfs/18_UCSAnnual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/79EB-3VFJ]; see also JANET DIFIORE, THE STATE OF
OUR JUDICIARY 2019, at 5 (2019), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/
files/2019-02/19_SOJ-Speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV98-CZPS].
3. The New York Supreme Court is responsible for cases outside the lower courts’
purview. It handles a broad range of matters including those “civil matters beyond the
monetary limits of the lower courts’ jurisdiction; divorce, separation and annulment
proceedings; equity suits, such as mortgage foreclosures and injunctions; and criminal
prosecutions of felonies.” See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., supra note 2, at 40.
4. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8018(a) (McKinney 2020). But if someone happened to file a
foreclosure action to under article 13 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, it
would be an additional $190 fee. See id. 8018(a)(1)(ii).
5. See id. 8020(a). A “Request for Judicial Intervention” is a form that a party files with
the court to request that a judge become involved in a matter. See Glossary, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED
CT. SYS., https://www.nycourts.gov/CourtHelp/GoingToCourt/glossary.shtml [https://
perma.cc/567J-YES] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
6. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8020. A “Note of Issue” is a form that informs “the court that all
documents are ready for the court’s review or that the case is ready for trial.” See Glossary,
supra note 5.
7. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8020(a).
8. See, e.g., Michael L. Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality
in Mediation, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 12 (1988); see also Overeem v. Neuhoff, 722
N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 (App. Div. 2001) (“The law is well settled that stipulations of settlement
are favored by the courts.”).
9. See ADR ADVISORY COMM., INTERIM REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
STATEWIDE ADR ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1, 7 (2019), https://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/
default/files/document/files/2019-05/InterimReportRecommFeb-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DS8T-Q6MJ].
10. See generally Press Release, Marks, supra note 1; see also ADR ADVISORY COMM.,
supra note 9, at 3–4. A “presumptive” ADR mechanism assumes that every civil case can be
resolved using an alternative dispute resolution process. See infra note 133 and accompanying
text (describing presumptive mediation in detail).
11. See Alternative Dispute Resolution at the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/olp/adr/doj-statistics.htm
[https://perma.cc/K4VE-LXR3]
(last
updated June 6, 2018).
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referred, and almost half of all those that were court-ordered, settled.12 The
DOJ estimated that, in 2017 alone, it saved the following as a result of ADR:
$15,521,275 of litigation and discovery expenses, 13,886 days of attorney
and staff time, and 1967 months of litigation.13
With over 19 million people in New York State14 and approximately 8.4
million in New York City alone,15 the judiciary’s new “Presumptive, Early
Alternative Dispute Resolution” initiative has the potential to be
“transformational.”16 However, the degree to which this undertaking will be
beneficial for all parties involved remains to be seen. At present, it is unclear
what will happen to those who enter a presumptive ADR session without a
lawyer present to help them navigate this unknown terrain.
This Note analyzes the system-wide initiative that the New York State
Unified Court System17 has adopted and explores the policy implications of
adopting a presumptive ADR program for unrepresented litigants.18 This
Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on mediation and
illuminates both its social and legal significance. Part II explains the new
presumptive ADR program in New York State and explores how it could
potentially impact unrepresented parties within the context of mediation.
Lastly, Part III recommends that the New York judiciary adopt a six-factor
test and expand limited-scope representation to help protect and support this
vulnerable population.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See QuickFacts: New York; United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/NY,US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/AUL3-GCQA]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
15. New York City has a population of 8,398,748 as of July 1, 2018. See QuickFact: New
York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
newyorkcitynewyork [https://perma.cc/9AZN-FC8Y] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
16. See Press Release, Marks, supra note 1, at 1 (calling this new initiative “a
transformational move to advance the delivery and quality of civil justice in New York”); see
also Michael J. Graetz, Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court Funding Crisis,
DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 96, 97 (noting that the state courts “resolve the vast majority of
our legal disputes” and “hear more than 95 percent of all court cases filed in the United
States”).
17. The New York State Unified Court System is a system of courts and court
administration set forth in article VI of the New York State Constitution. See N.Y. CONST. art.
VI, § 1. This Note refers to the system as “the New York State courts,” “the court system,”
or “the judiciary.”
18. Although this large-scale effort calls for presumptive early alternative dispute
resolution, this Note focuses solely on mediation as it is the most commonly used process in
both state and federal courts. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New
Arbitration,” 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 70 (2012). For purposes of this Note, the term
unrepresented will be used interchangeably with the terms pro se (Latin for “for oneself” or
“on one’s own behalf”) and self-represented to refer to individuals who are not accompanied
by a lawyer. See Reginald A. Holmes, Unrepresented Party (Pro Se) Arbitrations—Part 1:
The Arbitrator’s Duty and the Fairness Imperative, 70 DISP. RESOL. J. 97, 98 (2015).
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I. PRESUMPTIVE MEDIATION: HOW WE GOT HERE
To understand why presumptive mediation puts pro se litigants in a
precarious position, it is necessary to appreciate not only what it is but also
how it developed. Part I.A focuses on mediation, its development, and how
it functions today. It then outlines the merits of mediation within the legal
dispute context. Part I.B discusses how presumptive mediation found its way
to New York State courts.
A. Laying the Groundwork: The Ins and Outs of Mediation
Because litigation can be expensive, time-consuming, and disruptive,19
courts, scholars, and lawmakers developed ADR processes as alternative
methods for resolving conflicts in the legal arena.20
While adjudication is generally an adversarial, win-lose process, ADR
contemplates fairness21 and encompasses a number of different processes
that resolve disputes, conflicts, and cases using creative methods.22 The most
common processes are negotiation, arbitration, and mediation.23 These
methods can be court-annexed, meaning they are supervised by a court in
some manner,24 or they can be entirely independent of the court system,
proceeding solely by agreement of the parties.25 Despite their differences in
formality and derivation, each was designed to help parties obtain a
resolution both quickly and efficiently.26
ADR processes are not new phenomena. While mediation can be traced
back to ancient China over 4000 years ago,27 litigation largely took center
19. See Janet DiFiore, The Excellence Initiative and the Rule of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1053, 1058 (2018) (noting that “long delays and excessive costs lead to an inevitable loss of
public respect for our justice system”).
20. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION, PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE 1 (3d ed. 2004).
21. See KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY: THE FRONTIERS OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 168 (2001) (highlighting how adjudication encourages lawyers to manipulate,
tell half-truths, deny responsibility, and withhold critical information in the interest of their
clients).
22. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 1–2.
23. Each of these processes resolves disputes outside formal litigation procedures. See
Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Real Estate
Matters: The New York Experience, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 437, 438–39 (2010).
24. See Joan Hogarth, Access to Justice for the Pro Se Litigant in Mediation: A New York
City Experience, 65 FED. LAW. 86, 88 (2018).
25. See Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, Note, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49
DRAKE L. REV. 367, 371 (2001) (noting the fundamental difference between mandatory and
voluntary mediation); see also Danny McFadden, Practice Note, Developments in
International Commercial Mediation: US, UK, Asia, India and EU, 8 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB.
J. 299, 302 (2015) (highlighting the use of ADR clauses in contracts of large U.S.
corporations).
26. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 6.
27. See Kevin C. Clark, Student Article, The Philosophical Underpinning and General
Workings of Chinese Mediation Systems: What Lessons Can American Mediators Learn?, 2
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 117, 117 n.3 (2002); see also Shahla F. Ali, The Legal Framework for
Med-Arb Developments in China: Recent Cases, Institutional Rules and Opportunities, 10
DISP. RESOL. INT’L 119, 127–28 (2016) (discussing the development of mediation in ancient
China).
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stage in the United States until 1976, when the Pound Conference offered
Americans a new way to approach dispute resolution.28 This was the
country’s first step towards systematically developing and coordinating
mediation programs.29 Federal judges, legal scholars, and the American Bar
Association, among others, gathered to debate and discuss the overcrowded,
costly court system.30 From there, Neighborhood Justice Centers (NJCs)
emerged across the nation and the concept of the “multi-door courthouse”
was born.31
Since 1976, mediation has gained recognition and widespread approval in
the United States.32 Moreover, “during the last thirty years . . . [it has]
expanded beyond its century-long home in collective bargaining to become
an integral and growing part of the processes of dispute resolution in the
courts.”33
To understand why mediation has become a pervasive mechanism in court
systems across the country, this Note first examines what mediation entails
and then assesses both its advantages and disadvantages.
1. What It Is: A Catalyst for Settlement
In the context of legal conflicts, mediator Kenneth Cloke said that “the law
is designed to contain and control conflict, not resolve or transform it; . . . to
suppress emotions, not complete them; to settle cases, not search for
underlying issues; to announce third-party decisions, not facilitate
consensus.”34 When questioning whether there is anything better than the
rule of law, Cloke posited that there is in fact something better—something
that resolves and transforms conflict, contemplates emotions, searches for

28. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 30–31; Ettie Ward, Mandatory Court-Annexed
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States Federal Courts: Panacea or Pandemic?,
81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 77, 81 (2007); see also Thomas O. Main, Mediation: An Unlikely
Villain, 34 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 537, 545 (2019) (supporting the Pound Conference’s
noteworthiness by highlighting how it ushered in a broad-based ADR movement supported by
those outside the judiciary and academia: corporate counsel, the media, consumer advocates,
and both ends of the political spectrum).
29. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 32.
30. Id.
31. These centers are “organizations designed to provide mediation services for resolving
interpersonal disputes as an alternative to going to court.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT, at iii (1980),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/65513NCJRS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FHNPW6C]. NJCs were first adopted as a pilot project after the Pound Conference to see if
mediation could help resolve minor disputes referred by local courts. They are known today
as Dispute Resolution Centers and their work has led to the institutionalization of ADR in
court systems in jurisdictions around the country. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 33.
32. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 33–34.
33. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003), https://
www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKe
y=9b244b42-269c-769e-9f89-590ce048d0dd&forceDialog=0
[https://perma.cc/9ES5GXDY].
34. See CLOKE, supra note 21, at 168.
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underlying issues, and facilitates consensus—and that something is
mediation.35
Mediation is a process of resolving conflict by which a neutral third party,
not otherwise involved in the dispute, assists parties in their negotiations.36
The neutral third party, known as the mediator, is tasked with facilitating
communication between the parties.37 First, the mediator seeks to understand
the nature of the problem and each side’s underlying interests.38 Then, the
mediator helps generate various options or potential solutions that might
resolve the issue in an effort to promote settlement.39 This third party has a
duty to be neutral while assisting in the resolution of a conflict40 and has no
authority to impose a binding decision.41
Further distinguishing mediation from adjudication, the session does not
follow traditional rules of evidence or procedure.42 Parties also are not
typically bound by their communications, meaning that statements made
during mediation are not admissible in subsequent judicial proceedings.43
Additionally, this flexible model allows the parties to dictate the mediator’s
style of negotiation, letting them tailor the process and the resolution to their

35. Id. at 169–70.
36. See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 1 (2018).
Negotiation is a process whereby parties identify issues, develop options that respond to those
issues, and work together to attempt to find a resolution. See JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA P.
LOVE, THE MIDDLE VOICE: MEDIATING CONFLICT SUCCESSFULLY 12 n.4 (2009). It is one of
the least formal methods for resolving disputes. See Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 25, at 369.
37. See COLE ET AL., supra note 36, at 2 (noting that the mediator “listens, empathizes,
encourages emotional outbursts when constructive, presses the parties to face facts, urges them
to listen, and commends their efforts to accommodate”); see also STULBERG & LOVE, supra
note 36, at 5.
38. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 36.
39. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2006); see
also James H. Stark & Douglas N. Frenkel, Changing Minds: The Work of Mediators and
Empirical Studies of Persuasion, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 263, 266 (2013). Stark and
Frenkel explain that most mediators use persuasive interventions like group brainstorming
practices and role reversals because facilitation alone is not enough to help parties reach a
resolution. Stark & Frankel, supra, at 273.
40. See STULBERG & LOVE, supra note 36, at 5; see also KOVACH, supra note 20, at 211.
However, the word “neutral” is considered a misnomer by some ADR scholars in part because
a third party can never be entirely neutral. See, e.g., CLOKE, supra note 21, at 12–14 (discussing
the debate around the word “neutral”); see also KOVACH, supra note 20, at 211 (recognizing
that neutrality is central to mediation theory and practice, but that there are no specific
guidelines for it).
41. See STULBERG & LOVE, supra note 36, at 5.
42. See Prigoff, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing the benefits of confidentiality in mediation);
see also CLOKE, supra note 21, at 169–70.
43. See Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Mediative
Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 950–51 (1997)
(discussing the importance of confidentiality in mediation). However, jurisdictions have
different approaches to protecting disclosures made by parties during mediation. Id. at 951.
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needs.44 Thus, the mediation process can differ depending on the mediator’s
approach, as well as the type of dispute and the parties’ relationship.45
2. Why Some Like It: The Advantages of Mediation
As one of the most commonly used ADR processes, mediation is unique,
and favored, for many reasons.46 First and foremost, the features of
mediation provide parties with distinct advantages that other ADR processes
lack.47 ADR is designed to foster independent decision-making48 and
encourage the parties to reach a compromise themselves.49 This differs
vastly from arbitration where parties submit their dispute for resolution by a
third-party neutral who functions as the decision maker.50
The process also enables mediators to offer different perspectives that
parties may not have previously considered.51 For example, one practitioner
noted that during a mediation, the mediator “pointed out to both sides the
risks inherent in going to court.”52 She said, “Weaknesses in my case that I
had dismissed as minimal were suddenly food for thought—who really knew
what a jury might do?”53
44. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Documen
tFileKey=9b244b42-269c-769e-9f89-590ce048d0dd&forceDialog=0
[https://perma.cc/
9ES5-GXDY]. Mediators commonly adopt either a facilitative or evaluative technique. The
former focuses on enhancing communication between the parties while the latter evaluates the
merits of the case and can express opinions regarding the strength or viability of claims. See
Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 155, 155–56 (1998); see also Leonard L.
Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the
Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 24 (1996).
45. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 15.
46. See generally Dorcas Quek, Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron?: Examining the
Feasibility of Implementing a Court-Mandated Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 479, 482–83 (2010) (highlighting the general benefits of mediation).
47. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 27 (calling mediation “the equivalent of a multifunctional Swiss Army knife” in the
“‘toolbox’ of approaches to conflict”).
48. See STULBERG & LOVE, supra note 36, at 129.
49. See Prigoff, supra note 8, at 13 (stating that “[t]he trend towards compromise and
settlement of disputes, which mediation advances, is clear”).
50. The arbitrator reaches a conclusion on the disputed issue, and that advisory ruling is
generally binding. It is less formal than a trial because the rules of evidence and court
procedure are rarely meticulously applied. However, it is still considered quite formal on the
spectrum of all ADR processes. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 7; STULBERG & LOVE, supra
note 36, at 12 n.2.
51. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?”: Mediation’s
“Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 13 (1996) (discussing how
mediators add value to negotiations by helping parties (1) offer more information and ensure
its reliability and (2) perceive each other “more fully and accurately” than if left to their own
devices).
52. See Lorraine M. Brennan, Start Spreading the News: Mandatory Mediation Comes to
New York, LAW.COM (July 23, 2014), https://www.law.com/sites/lorrainebrennan/2014/07/23/
start-spreading-the-news-mandatory-mediation-comes-to-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/PR8CLEJS].
53. Id.
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In addition to the advantages a third-party neutral can provide, mediation
itself offers procedural benefits and protections to parties that they would not
have in a traditional court setting. Each side can veto a proposed solution54
or craft a resolution that benefits all.55 This “informality and infinite capacity
for creative results”56 are critical when parties want to maintain a personal or
professional relationship,57 when there are interests that the parties cannot
isolate and explore on their own,58 or when parties want to maintain control
over their dispute.59 The process is also shielded from public exposure
because parties’ agreements, statutes, and ethical codes call for
confidentiality.60
Prominent ADR scholars also argue that mediation increases the
probability that all involved will comply with the outcome because it requires
those affected to participate in developing solutions.61 Moreover, studies
have shown that party participation in the process and control over the results
contribute to greater party satisfaction overall.62
One cannot talk about mediation without discussing its effects on
transactional costs, both direct and indirect.63 ADR scholars, practitioners,
and courts agree that “the sooner ADR intervention occurs, the greater the
amount of monetary savings.”64 Parties can avoid spending on direct costs
like attorney’s fees, management costs,65 and employees’ productivity, as
well as indirect costs like the emotional expense that comes from the dispute
and the general court process.66

54. See STULBERG & LOVE, supra note 36, at 12–13.
55. See CLOKE, supra note 21, at 169–70.
56. Id. at 169.
57. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 15.
58. Id. at 75–76.
59. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 39, at 1–2 (noting the consensual nature of the process
whereby parties may choose to pursue other remedies and not settle). See generally Donna
Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer, Modern
Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 211 (2004) (discussing an experiment on
party preferences in ADR processes which revealed that participants value control over the
process, substantive rules, and outcome).
60. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 18, at 82 (calling confidentiality the “hallmark of the
mediation process”).
61. See STULBERG & LOVE, supra note 36, at 12–13; see also Roselle L. Wissler, The
Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q.
55, 65–68 (2004).
62. See Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective on a
Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 885, 887–88 (1998).
Mediation literature also indicates that parties are satisfied with the mediation process even if
they do not reach an agreement because it can help clarify legal issues or bring about
settlement in the future. See Frank E. A. Sander, Another View of Mandatory Mediation, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2017, at 16, 16 n.4.
63. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 126–27.
64. See id. at 126; see also Press Release, Marks, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that the
transition to an early ADR model will partially play a role in decreasing costs).
65. Parties that are involved in disputes often have to sacrifice time normally devoted to
their managerial roles. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 126–27.
66. Id. at 127.
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Finally, the last common assertion is that mediation benefits judicial
economy by reducing congested court dockets.67 In a society with
backlogged courts,68 courts have looked to mediation as a solution—a
mechanism to provide more efficient and swift access to justice.69
3. Why Some Question It: The Disadvantages of Mediation
Despite its much-lauded benefits, mediation can be an inapt device for
resolution for a number of reasons. One of the primary drawbacks of
mediation is its lack of formality, which implicates both procedural and
constitutional justice.70 In adjudication, there are formal rules where lawyers
can call witnesses to testify and procure evidence, but “mediation is not
bound by evidentiary and procedural rules.”71 Without procedural and
constitutional protections, an unjust settlement can result especially in cases
where parties have disparate levels of sophistication and resources.72
Mediation is also not an appropriate avenue if one or both parties desire a
resolution for precedential value.73 Often, personal disputes involve issues
of collective interest that sometimes implicate national policy.74 Therefore,
the decision to mediate them in a private setting has political overtones.75
And because “cycles of litigation attend recognition of and creation of new
rights,” moving these conversations into the black box of mediation
potentially stunts the development of law on issues of public concern.76
Along similar lines, one downside to mediation’s private nature is that it
precludes a public record.77 This means that individuals on a local, national,
67. See Lebovits & Hidalgo, supra note 23, at 438; see also Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Is
Europe Headed Down the Primrose Path with Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N.C. J. INT’L &
COM. REG. 981, 1007 (2012).
68. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., supra note 2, at 3–4 (highlighting the
backlog reduction in New York courts).
69. See id. at 19; see also Nolan-Haley, supra note 67, at 1007 (noting that advocates of
mandatory mediation find it practical—especially when taking into account the appeal of
reducing overcrowded court dockets).
70. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1984)
(highlighting how mediations lack of both a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial
involvement problematic).
71. Nolan-Haley, supra note 18, at 70; see also supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
72. As indicated, courts have procedural mechanisms that can make up for imbalances of
power between the parties. Judges can ask magistrate judges to develop factual records or ask
law clerks to do research. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of
Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 260 (1996) (discussing the
procedural mechanisms judges can utilize to make sure “mismatching of resources will not
skew the substantive result”).
73. See Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph B. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks
and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5 (2012) (In discussing the “widereaching aggregate impact” of Brown v. Board of Education on structural inequality, Bush and
Folger recognize that “mediation could never have more than minimal effects, if any, on
problems of structural injustice.”)
74. Id.
75. See Weinstein, supra note 72, at 255 (highlighting the shift in societal perception of
domestic violence matters from a historically private context to a national one).
76. Id. at 256.
77. Id. at 263.
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and global scale can be denied important information that involves issues
which concern the community at large.78
Lastly, it is simply not appropriate for every dispute.79 For example, when
there is an imbalance of power, litigation may be a better option since
mediators cannot guarantee equality between the parties because party
autonomy shifts power to the parties.80 When a party treats the process of
mediation as little more than a reconnaissance mission to gain a tactical
advantage over their opponent, the benefits of the process dissolve.81 Thus,
every case must be ripe and ready for compromise.82 Otherwise, mediation’s
overriding goal of efficiency will not be realized.
B. How It Made Its Way to the Big Apple
In 1947, the federal government passed the Taft-Hartley Act,83 which
created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and effectively
recognized mediation for the first time.84 By 1990, with ADR’s benefits
growing ever more prominent, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990,85 commencing pervasive ADR use in federal courts.86 Eight years
later, Congress passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,87
which required each federal district to use ADR in civil actions and strongly
defined federal rules for ADR procedures.88
78. Id. (using the example of a products liability suit where potentially negative health
effects of a particular drug may not yet be public).
79. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 76 (highlighting instances that experts have determined
are inappropriate for mediation).
80. See infra notes 198–215 and accompanying text (discussing the unequal bargaining
power that can result when a pro se party faces a represented party in mediation).
81. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 18, at 82; see also Lebovits & Hidalgo, supra note 23,
at 449.
82. See Hazel Genn, Essay, What Is Civil Justice for?: Reform, ADR, and Access to
Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397, 406 (2012) (noting that important factors in settlement
include the readiness of parties to mediate). See generally Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B.
Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR
Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994).
83. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2018)).
84. This agency was created in part to “promote the development of sound and stable labor
management relationships” and to minimize the effect of lockouts and strikes on the free flow
of commerce. See Mission & Values, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV.,
https://www.fmcs.gov/aboutus/mission-values/ [https://perma.cc/VY3D-FULQ] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2020); see also David L. Cole, Government in the Bargaining Process: The Role of
Mediation, 333 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 43–44 (1961) (highlighting the role
of this “best known” federal mediation agency in the early 1960s).
85. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
86. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 87 n.33. See generally Jerome B. Simandle, Enhancing
Access to ADR for Unrepresented Litigants, A.B.A. DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 6.
87. Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658
(2018)).
88. See KOVACH, supra note 20, at 87 n.33. Shortly thereafter, the First Circuit affirmed
the power of courts to compel mediation. In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 136, 147 (1st Cir.
2002).
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1. The Feds Ushered It in
New York has four U.S. district courts—the Eastern, Northern, Western,
and Southern Districts of New York—three of which employ automatic
mediation programs and all of which have witnessed the benefits of
mediation.89
On January 1, 2006, the Western District became the first New York
district court to adopt what was considered a “visionary and unconventional”
approach to resolving disputes.90 Its ADR pilot program was “designed to
provide quicker, less expensive, and potentially more satisfying alternatives
to continuing litigation, without impairing the quality of justice or the right
to trial,”91 and it was renewed annually until it was fully instituted in 2010.92
The program mandated automatic mediation for almost all civil cases, unless
parties agreed to a different ADR intervention or they fell within a number
of exemptions.93 Although no specific exemptions were provided for pro se
litigants, parties could file a motion to opt out, which would be granted only
on a showing of “good cause.”94 The court explicitly provided that
“[i]nconvenience, travel costs, attorney fees, or other costs shall not
constitute ‘good cause.’”95 The party seeking relief carried the burden of
showing “why ADR has no reasonable chance of being productive.”96
Of the 3011 cases that were subject to this default process in 2014 alone,
2360 were settled before mediation, at the session, or within sixty days
following it.97 Given the Western District’s success, the Northern District
implemented a similar pilot program for mandatory mediation in January
2014, which was fully adopted in May 2016.98 The Northern District

89. See Gary Shaffer, Automatic Court-Annexed Mediation in New York’s Federal
District Courts: Sometimes Number Don’t Lie, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Apr.
2019, at 51, 51; see, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT W. DIST. OF N.Y., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PLAN 1 (2019), https://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/sites/nywd/files/ADR%
20Committee%20--%20Amended%20ADR%20Plan%20Effective%20Date%205-112018%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA9K-CZ8U] [hereinafter W.D.N.Y. PLAN].
90. See Michael Petro, Federal ADR Chips Away at Court Docket, BUFF. L.J. (June 22,
2015, 10:46 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/news/2015/06/22/federal-adr-chipsaway-at-court-docket.html [https://perma.cc/GR68-WX47]; see also W.D.N.Y. PLAN, supra
note 89, at 1.
91. See W.D.N.Y. PLAN, supra note 89, at 1.
92. See Shaffer, supra note 89, at 51.
93. Exemptions included habeas corpus and extraordinary writs, social security and
bankruptcy appeals, and cases that exclusively or predominantly implicated issues of public
policy. See W.D.N.Y. PLAN, supra note 89, at 3, 7.
94. Id. at 3–4.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id.; see also Shaffer, supra note 89, at 51 (explaining that “the rule does not refer to
the chance of settlement” and mediation offers other benefits like “narrow[ing] issues,
expeditiously work[ing] through discovery, and begin[ning] the foundation for settlement
talks”).
97. See Shaffer, supra note 89, at 51–52 (using information supplied by Barry Radlin,
ADR program administrator for the Western District of New York).
98. Id. at 52. See generally U.S. DIST. COURT N. DIST. OF N.Y., GENERAL ORDER #47:
MANDATORY MEDITATION PROGRAM (2018), https://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/sites/nynd/
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explicitly called for mediation, captioning it the “Mandatory Mediation
Program” and included one notable exception to automatic referrals—civil
pro se actions.99 From January 1, 2014, to January 28, 2020, 1134 cases went
through the program, 36 percent (or 410 cases) of which settled.100 While
these figures are significantly lower than those of the Western District, this
data does not include those matters that settled before or within sixty days
after mediation.101
In 2011, the Southern District followed suit by automatically referring
certain cases to mediation.102 Currently, the Southern District refers all
counseled employment discrimination cases,103 some Fair Labor Standards
Act cases,104 and certain § 1983 police and city misconduct claims105 to
mediation at early litigation stages before the formal discovery process.106
The judge assigned to a case can exempt it with or without the request of the
parties.107 Additionally, for employment discrimination claims filed by pro
se litigants, the Southern District allows judges to refer cases to mediation on
a case-by-case basis and offers pro se plaintiffs free limited-scope
representation.108
files/general-ordes/GO47_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU4H-KMQR] [hereinafter N.D.N.Y.
ORDER].
99. The order noted that “these actions may be referred to the Court’s Assisted Mediation
Program.” See N.D.N.Y. ORDER, supra note 98, at 3, 12 n.3.
100. 52 percent of (or 593) cases did not settle through the program and 12 percent of (or
131) cases are undergoing mandatory mediation but were not completed during this time
frame. See ADR Program Statistics, U.S. DISTRICT CT. N. DISTRICT N.Y., http://
media.nynp.uscourts.gov/adrms/display_website_stats.cfm [https://perma.cc/B2VK-L9DF]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
101. See Shaffer, supra note 89, at 52.
102. See Mediation/ADR, U.S. DISTRICT CT. S. DISTRICT N.Y., https://nysd.uscourts.gov/
programs/mediation-adr [https://perma.cc/JN89-TCKX] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
103. See Second Amended Standing Administrative Order, 11 Misc. 003 (S.D.N.Y. 2015);
see also REBECCA PRICE, U.S. DIST. COURT S. DIST. OF N.Y., MEDIATION PROGRAM ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (2017), https://nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/Mediation/Mediation%
20Program%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report.2016.Final%20Draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C73Q-HLMS] [hereinafter 2016 ANNUAL REPORT].
104. See Press Release, Office of the Dist. Court Exec., Southern District of New York
ADR Program Announces Pilot Programs for FLSA and § 1983 Effective October 3, 2016
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/Mediation/Mediation%
20Rules%20and%20Procedures/FLSA%20Announcement%20and%20Order.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/GLT8-PZ5P]; see also 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 103, at 2.
105. See Mediation/ADR, supra note 102; see also 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 103,
at 2.
106. See 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 103, at 2.
107. The local rules do not list any guidelines for exemption. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE
SECOND CIRCUIT, LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN
AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK 80 (2018), https://nysd.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/local_rules/rules-2018-10-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW2N-XSDB].
108. See generally Rebecca Price, Limited-Scope Pro Se Program Provides Access and
Justice, GPSOLO, Sept./Oct. 2016, at 60; see also Mediation in Pro Se Employment
Discrimination Cases, U.S. DISTRICT CT. S. DISTRICT N.Y., https://nysd.uscourts.gov/
attorney/probono/mediation-in-prose-employment-discrimination-cases
[https://perma.cc/
5VDY-BBPF] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). Limited representation is also referred to as
“discrete tasks, unbundled services or limited-scope assistance.” See Hogarth, supra note 24,
at 88 (providing more details regarding this limited-scope representation program). Pro se
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In 2016, 1072 cases were placed into the program, and 1051 of those were
closed by December 5, 2017.109 Excluding § 1983 cases, the settlement rates
for the cases sent to mediation were largely consistent with the rates reported
in 2015; roughly 43 percent of automatic employment cases, 48 percent of
pro se employment cases, and 35 percent of § 1983 cases were settled.110
The Southern District also reported that pro se employment cases that were
resolved through mediation took, on average, 160 days from date of referral
to closing.111
The Eastern District has a court-annexed mediation program, but unlike its
counterparts, it is not compulsory and a district or magistrate judge must
designate civil cases for inclusion.112 The local rule governing mediation
does not mention any exemptions or opt-out provisions.113 However, like
the Southern District, it offers pro se litigants free limited-scope
representation for the purpose of mediation in employment discrimination
cases.114
In 2018, 501 cases were referred to mediation, representing a 43 percent
increase from the same reporting period in 2017.115 Roughly 60 percent of
the 501 cases were Fair Labor Standards Act and employment discrimination
cases.116 Of those cases, a session was conducted in 397 cases, and 64
percent of those referred were settled.117
plaintiffs have fourteen days to object to the mediation or to the appointment of counsel.
Defendants can request that the judge vacate the referral order. If the plaintiff accepts
appointment, they meet with the pro bono attorney to define the scope of the representation
which ends at the end of the mediation. Id. at 88–89.
109. See 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 103, at 2. As in the Northern District, this date
did not include settlements made before and within sixty days after the mediation. See Shaffer,
supra note 89, at 53.
110. See 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 103, at 6. In 2015, 46 percent of automatic
employment cases, 66 percent of pro se employment, and 64 percent of § 1983 cases settled.
Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 3.
112. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT, supra note 107, r. 83.8(b)(1). Under
the Mediation Advocacy Program, a judge refers the case to mediation if litigants identify
mediation as a means for resolution or if the judge decides the case is apt for that ADR process.
See Hogarth, supra note 24, at 89.
113. See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT, supra note 107.
114. See Pro Se Mediation Advocacy Program, U.S. DISTRICT CT. E. DISTRICT N.Y., https://
www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pro-se-mediation-advocacy-program
[https://perma.cc/DY5LQH58] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). The court depends on a roster of volunteer attorneys, so
there is no guarantee that a pro se litigant will be appointed a lawyer. If assigned one, the pro
se litigant determines the scope of representation with counsel. See Hogarth, supra note 24, at
89.
115. 88 percent were referred by magistrate judges and 12 percent were referred by district
judges. See U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF N.Y., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REPORT 2
(2018),
https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/2018%20ADR%20Annual%
20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYB5-YFTM].
116. Fair Labor Standards Act cases constituted about 53 percent of the mediation referrals
and employment discrimination cases constituted 10 percent. The report notes, however, that
employment discrimination matters that were referred and involved pro se plaintiffs were
resolved at a lower rate. See id. at 3.
117. This settlement rate includes cases that were resolved at the end of mediation and
those that resolved after a referral but before a formal mediation session. Some cases that
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As a whole, the data presented above suggests that there is enthusiasm for
mediation in the federal district courts. It also suggests that each court’s
mediation program has some level of effectiveness. At the very least, when
parties reached a settlement agreement, they were spared “the rigors of full
discovery and the expense of motion practice and trial,” which serves as a
testament to some of mediation’s most prominent benefits.118 Lastly, most
districts appear to recognize pro se litigants’ positions in these spheres and
to design protective measures that aim to support this population during the
mediation process.
2. The State Followed Suit
Following in the federal district courts’ footsteps, the New York State
courts adopted a pilot program for mandatory mediation in July 2014.119
Established exclusively for the New York Supreme Court’s commercial
division in Manhattan,120 the program automatically referred every fifth case
to mediation.121 It was scheduled to run for eighteen months to allow enough
time for both practitioners and the judiciary to evaluate its efficacy.122
Lawyers, professors, and judges believed a mandatory process was necessary
because, while court rules allow commercial division judges the authority to
direct parties to mediation, they felt judges often do so at an “infrequent,
tentative pace.”123
In February 2016, the judiciary ended this program despite acknowledging
that it was “positive and instructive.”124 They felt that “the most effective
means of promoting mediation [was] for Commercial Division Justices to

were resolved before a session were aided by mediator assistance or were resolved via direct
negotiation by the parties. See id. at 2.
118. Colleen McMahon, ADR in the Southern District of New York: Quality Is Key, FED.
LAW., Aug. 2018, at 80, 80.
119. See ADR Overview, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/
comdiv/ny/ADR_overview.shtml [https://perma.cc/BQ6X-KJWL] (last visited Feb. 14,
2020).
120. Established in 1995, the commercial division is a state court trial division devoted
solely to business cases. See Timothy S. Driscoll, Keeping Current: The New York State
Supreme Court Commercial Division: Past, Present, and Future, BUS. L. TODAY, Oct. 2014,
at 1, 1.
121. See ADR Overview, supra note 119.
122. See Brennan, supra note 52.
123. See Suevon Lee, With Few Exceptions, Proposed Pilot Mediation Program Draws
Support, LAW.COM (Feb. 16, 2019, 11:15 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/
almID/1202644396857/ [https://perma.cc/QJ4P-AM42]; see also THE CHIEF JUDGE’S TASK
FORCE ON COMMERCIAL LITIG. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 26 (2012), https://www.nycourts.gov/
LegacyPDFS/courts/comdiv/PDFs/ChiefJudgesTaskForceOnCommercialLitigationInThe21s
tpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GMH-JPG6] (claiming that mediation is substantially
underutilized in New York in part “because there is a broad disparity in the degree to which
judges refer matters to mediation”).
124. See Administrative Order, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS. (Jan. 28, 2016), https://
www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/courts/comdiv/ny/PDFs/AO-ADR22016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45HA-49TX].
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consider each and every case as a candidate for mediation.”125 However, this
did not mark the end of the state’s attempts to utilize an automatic referral
process for mediation.
In April 2017, the New York Supreme Court established a new pilot
project subjecting certain commercial cases filed outside the commercial
division to mandatory mediation.126 This new project offered exemptions for
those who could show that participation would subject them to “unreasonable
hardship or burden.”127 It also offered an unequivocal exemption for cases
involving self-represented parties.128
In January 2019, the judiciary extended this pilot project to include cases
involving a business entity, insurance, the Uniform Commercial Code, or
“other commercial” matters.129 The exemption for self-represented parties
remained.130
Just one month later, Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals
Janet DiFiore presented an address on the state of the New York judiciary.131
In her address, she highlighted the progress state courts have made to
eliminate case delays and announced reforms intended to enhance both the
delivery and quality of justice in the state court system.132 One of those
reforms was a presumptive,133 early court-sponsored ADR program for civil
cases meant to reduce litigation expenses and speed the litigation process.134
125. The court noted that the commercial division justices have reiterated their fundamental
commitment to mediation and their intention to consider seriously every case for referral.
They also agreed to consider making referrals in the early stages of litigation, including at the
preliminary conference. See id.
126. The pilot project applied to cases: (1) assigned to any justice who does not serve in
the commercial division, (2) designated as a contract matter on the Request for Judicial
Intervention by the filing party, and (3) where the filing party has requested a preliminary
conference. See Administrative Order, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS. 1 (Apr. 19, 2017), https://
www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/courts/1jd/supctmanh/AO-MandMedLong42017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M5KB-H4Q5].
127. Id. at 2.
128. See id.; see also Rules and Procedures of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program,
N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS. 7 (May 1, 2017), https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/
courts/comdiv/ny/PDFs/ADR-rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/53JX-MHTW].
129. See Administrative Order, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS. 1 (Jan. 22, 2019), http://
www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/courts/1jd/supctmanh/AO-12219-MAND-MED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NBY4-XWP2].
130. Id.
131. See also Press Release, Lawrence K. Marks, Chief Admin. Judge, Chief Judge Janet
DiFiore Presents Her State of Our Judiciary Address, Highlighting Further Progress to
Eliminate Case Delays, Announcing Additional Reforms to Enhance the Delivery and Quality
of Justice in NY (Feb. 26, 2019), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/
files/2019-02/PR19_06.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRG4-N545]. See generally DIFIORE, supra
note 2.
132. See Press Release, Marks, supra note 131. See generally DIFIORE, supra note 2.
133. The rule of presumptive mediation stands for the notion that “mediation . . . should,
absent compelling indications to the contrary, be the first procedure used.” Thus, the mediator
first attempts to resolve disputes using customary mediation techniques and, if unsuccessful,
makes an informed recommendation for a different procedure. The presumption is overcome
when the goals of one or both parties cannot be satisfied, or mediation does not get the parties
to overcome barriers to settlement. See Sander & Goldberg, supra note 82, at 59.
134. See DIFIORE, supra note 2; see also Press Release, Marks, supra note 131, at 4.
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II. WHERE DO SELF-REPRESENTED PARTIES FIT IN?
The United States has long recognized the right of self-representation.135
In 2014, the New York State Permanent Commission on Access to Justice
reported that 1.8 million New Yorkers exercised this right, navigating civil
cases in state courts without an attorney.136 While this was a welcome 22
percent decrease from the 2.3 million reported in 2010, Helaine M. Barnett,
the commission chair, echoed Chief Judge DiFiore’s sentiment that “we still
have a long road ahead of us” to ensure an accessible civil justice system for
every New Yorker.137
At a joint legislative hearing on the 2019–2020 judiciary budget, Chief
Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks remarked that the New York State
“court system is large, and its challenges are complex. Every day, it serves
19 million people in 62 counties, over 60 cities, well over a thousand towns
and villages, and hundreds of courthouses across a physically large state.”138
This new measure will undoubtedly impact a substantial number of people,
leaving the most vulnerable populations, those that cannot afford to hire
representation, in potentially compromised positions. As evidenced,
mediation’s advantages and disadvantages have generated a lively academic
debate.139 There is also ample literature regarding access to justice, or the
lack thereof, for pro se parties.140 When looking at this program within the
context of this dense scholarship, one must assess its viability and efficacy.
Does it balance its goal of expediting the litigation process while
safeguarding justice for the self-represented party?141

135. On September 24, 1789, the first United States Congress passed the Judiciary Act of
1789, which recognized “[t]hat in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and
manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel.” Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The
U.S. Supreme Court in Faretta v. California reaffirmed this legal entitlement and held that a
criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to defend himself or herself. 422 U.S. 806,
818–21, 834 (1975).
136. See THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 2, 7 (2014), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/
default/files/document/files/2018-05/CLS%20TaskForce%20Report%202014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9N8E-9VRP].
137. See PERMANENT COMM’N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 2 (Nov. 30, 2018), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/
files/2019-10/18_ATJ-Comission_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ49-WL2U].
138. See Joint Legislative Public Hearing on 2019–2020 Executive Budget Proposal:
Topic Public Protection Before the S. Fin. Comm. & Assemb. Ways & Means Comm., 2019–
2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (N.Y. 2019) (statement of Chief Admin. Judge Lawrence K. Marks),
https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/testimony_given_by_chief_administrative_judg
e_of_the_unified_court_system.pdf [https://perma.cc/98JN-V2C9] [hereinafter Legislative
Hearing].
139. See supra Part I.A.
140. See infra Part II.B (defining access to justice and explaining it in relation to selfrepresented litigants).
141. The New York State court system’s mission is “to promote the rule of law and serve
the public by achieving just and timely resolution of all matters before the courts.” See,
Excellence Initiative, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED COURT SYS., https://www.nycourts.gov/excellenceinitiative/ [https://perma.cc/NU5W-EKH5] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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Part II.A addresses what the presumptive ADR program entails and the
motivations behind its implementation. Part II.B then delves into how this
process could potentially affect unrepresented litigants.
A. On Paper, the Program Says . . .
On May 14, 2019, the judiciary officially announced details of a statewide
initiative.142 Calling it a “transformational” move, the judiciary revealed that
all parties in civil cases will now be referred to some form of ADR, with a
focus on court-sponsored mediation, at the onset of each case.143 The court
system will allow for “appropriate” opt-out exceptions but did not define
what will qualify as appropriate.144 Nevertheless, the court system believes
that an early and presumptive model will help reduce case delays, improve
case outcomes, and lower costs for both the parties and the judiciary.145
The judiciary intends to take advantage of and build upon the courts’
existing network of ADR programs and resources.146 With the help of its
ADR office, the court system plans to work with the state’s trial courts, law
schools, and nonprofit community dispute resolution centers (CDRCs)147 to
offer parties access to free or reduced-fee ADR services.148 The court system
stated that it will issue uniform rules and each jurisdiction will develop local
protocols, guidelines, and best practices to aid in the development and
expansion of existing mechanisms.149 Rollout began in September 2019.150

142. See generally Press Release, Marks, supra note 1.
143. Id. at 1. For purposes of this Note, this will be considered a categorical referral to
ADR, as defined by Professor Frank Sander’s formulation, which applies when a legislative
mandate requires specific types of cases to undergo ADR. See Sander, supra note 62, at 16.
144. See Press Release, Marks, supra note 1, at 2.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. In the New York context, a CDRC is a “community-based, private, not-for-profit
program.” N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. DIV. OF PROF’L & COURT SERVS., STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT FOR NEW YORK STATE COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER MEDIATORS 1 n.1
(2009),
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-07/Standards_of_
Conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XBB-S3MJ]. CDRCs contract with the chief administrative
judge of the state court system “to provide conciliation, mediation, arbitration, or other types
of dispute resolution services. Id. They are primarily funded by the court system and every
county in New York State has a CDRC program. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS.,
COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTERS PROGRAM: ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 1
(2017–2018),
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2019-01/1718_CDRCP-ASR.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH8C-6G2T].
148. See Press Release, Marks, supra note 1, at 2.
149. The press release states that Deputy Chief Administrative Judges George Silver and
Michael Coccoma and the statewide ADR coordinator will work with administrative judges
and trial court judges along with “local bar associations and other stakeholders” to implement
this initiative. Id. at 2–3.
150. Id. at 3. Kings County Supreme Court is one jurisdiction that has adopted an ADR
plan to date. Effective November 12, 2019, it provides an opt-out provision “[u]pon good
cause shown at the first mediation, or anytime thereafter,” but it does not define what would
constitute good cause. See Presumptive ADR Plan: Kings County, Civil Term, N.Y. ST.
UNIFIED CT. SYS. 2 (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/
courts/2jd/kings/civil/PRESUMPTIVE-ADR-PLAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8HP-TZHA].
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The model came about as part of the Chief Judge DiFiore’s “Excellence
Initiative,” a “top-to-bottom examination of [court] operations aimed at
improving efficiency” and eliminating delays.151 By evaluating current court
processes and procedures, the judiciary wanted to ascertain what was
working well and what needed to be improved.152 Since the start of this
initiative in 2016, its reforms have led to reduced case backlogs and
expedited dispositions of matters.153 Thus, the judiciary and practitioners
alike hope that court-sponsored automatic presumptive referral of disputes to
early mediation will advance the goals of the initiative and enhance the
overall administration of justice.154
1. The Direct Approach: A Presumptive Mechanism
It is apparent from the judiciary’s statements that improving the
administration of justice involves, in part, two critical components: requiring
mediation for certain cases and implementing it at the earliest stage of
litigation.155
Looking at the first component, there is an active debate among ADR
scholars and professionals regarding whether participants must opt in or opt
out.156 That is, should parties be required to participate unless they can show
why it is not a good choice? Or should parties be offered mediation and
allowed to choose whether to pursue it?
In the federal district courts and the state court, the opt-out procedures
prevail, for the courts believe that they will result in a higher rate of
participation.157 Because the state court noted that court-sponsored
mediation remains underutilized, despite the growth of ADR programs in

151. See Craig Doran, Guest Essay:
Excellence Initiative Encourages Judicial
Accountability, DAILY MESSENGER (Jan. 6, 2018, 2:01 AM), https://www.mpnnow.com/news/
20180106/guest-essay-excellence-initiative-encourages-judicial-accountability
[https://perma.cc/8CJT-6JU3].
152. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., THE STATE OF OUR JUDICIARY, at i (2017),
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-11/SOJ-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z62F-CG5R].
153. See Legislative Hearing, supra note 138, at 1–2, 6. From January 2016 to February
2019, the judiciary reported a decrease in backlogs ranging from 24 percent in the civil term
of Bronx Supreme Court to more than 70 percent in other districts across the state. See
DIFIORE, supra note 2, at 5–6.
154. See Press Release, Marks, supra note 1.
155. See supra Part II.
156. See Quek, supra note 46, at 479; Wissler, supra note 61, at 565. This Note focuses
solely on opt-out and opt-in schemes. However, ADR scholars have developed a “continuum
of mandatoriness,” which distinguishes different levels of compulsion that can be imposed on
parties. See Quek, supra note 46, at 488–90.
157. See supra Part I; see also Press Release, Marks, supra note 1. Along similar lines,
social scientists have studied the impact of default options with respect to organ donation
volunteer rates. Some countries utilize opt-in policies that require citizens to indicate a
willingness to participate while others adopt opt-out policies that require citizens to indicate
their unwillingness to participate. One study revealed that donation rates were 82 percent
under an opt-out method and only 42 percent under an opt-in method. See Eric J. Johnson &
Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338, 1338–39 (2003).
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recent years,158 it follows that opt-in provisions pose a risk that parties may
not choose mediation if they do not understand and appreciate the option.159
By design, using opt-out provisions means that neither party has to request
mediation, which is beneficial for those who do not want to ask for it for fear
that their case will look weaker if they do.160 Moreover, some ADR scholars
argue that “[v]oluntariness is not about attendance.”161 Even when mediation
is required, the process remains voluntary because the parties decide the
outcome for themselves.162 This concept of self-determination, or who
makes the decision, can be protected by the mediator who is tasked with
making sure parties understand the process.163 Moreover, if a settlement
does not come to fruition and the mediator makes recommendations for the
next steps, it might be more readily accepted by both parties than those made
by any attorney present.164
2. The Urgency: An Immediate Method
While ADR is beneficial at any stage of litigation, Chief Judge DiFiore’s
Advisory Committee on ADR, which recommends presumptive mediation,
claims that courts tend to achieve greater results when they use mediation as
early as possible in a dispute.165 Additionally, the committee and other ADR
scholars have argued that the sooner the mediation takes place, the more
likely the parties are to settle.166
Beyond achieving a resolution, using mediation at the onset of a case can
save money and evade the emotional challenges that parties endure during
litigation.167 By avoiding a full-fledged discovery process, the parties will
158. See Press Release, Marks, supra note 1.
159. See ANDREA DONEFF & ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER, ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION:
MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND THE ART OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 20 (3d ed. 2014); Quek,
supra note 46, at 483 (underscoring the benefits of court-mandated mediation when parties
are unfamiliar or ignorant of the process).
160. See Quek, supra note 46, at 483 (noting that when a party initiates a mediation, it can
be interpreted as a sign of weakness).
161. See DONEFF & ORDOVER, supra note 159, at 137.
162. See Bullock & Gallagher, supra note 43, at 948 (“No party can be forced to settle or
otherwise alter his or her position in a mediation . . . .”).
163. See DONEFF & ORDOVER, supra note 159, at 136–37.
164. It can be difficult to determine the appropriate forum, and parties often fear that their
adversaries make suspect suggestions to obtain a tactical advantage. See Sander & Goldberg,
supra note 82, at 59.
165. Results include an enhancement of “parties’ sense of personal agency and selfdetermination in pursuing a resolution” and improvement of “parties’ communications with
each other and understanding of each other’s positions.” See ADR ADVISORY COMM., supra
note 9, at 3.
166. See id. at 3–4 (noting that “high settlement rates and participant satisfaction [are]
achieved from court referrals to early, presumptive mediation”); Roselle L. Wissler, CourtConnected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 677 (2002).
167. See ADR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 9, at 16–17 (“The goal of reducing avoidable
litigation costs is often best served by early mediation.”); Guthrie & Levin, supra note 62, at
895 n.31 (construing the phrase “cost savings” that results from mediation “to include savings
of time and emotional stress associated with protracted litigation”).
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spend less money and may avoid escalating the dispute.168 Involving
mediation at an early stage might also help the parties narrow issues or
provide parties with inexpensive early discovery of their adversaries’ claims
or defenses.169
B. In Practice, Others Argue . . .
In contrast to proponents’ beliefs regarding presumptive mediation
outlined in Part II.A, critics argue that an ADR process of this nature is
worrisome.170 Although this initiative is termed “presumptive” mediation,
many people are construing it to be mandatory and refer to it in that
manner.171 Thus, Part II.B focuses on the concerns opponents raise regarding
mandatory mediation, specifically in the context of pro se representation.
Before delving into these viewpoints, it is important to explain the concept
of access to justice and assess where self-represented litigants stand within
that framework.

168. See THE CHIEF JUDGE’S TASK FORCE ON COMMERCIAL LITIG. IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
supra note 123, at 27 (explaining that mediation is cost-effective for parties and the court
system when it is introduced at earlier stages of litigation because parties who have incurred
substantial legal fees may feel that they have little incentive to stop litigation and pursue ADR
practices).
169. Absent settlement, it can be valuable to know how and even if to proceed with
litigation. See STULBERG & LOVE, supra note 36, at 127 (noting that “[u]sing a mediator earlier
rather than later, can reduce strife, minimize problems, lower disputing costs, and establish a
framework for dealing constructively with issues that arise”).
170. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how a mandatory scheme affects parties’ selfdetermination and constitutes coercion); see also Letter from Roger Juan Maldonado,
President, N.Y.C. Bar, to Anthony Cannataro, Admin. Judge, Civil Court of the City of N.Y.
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2019577PresumptiveADR_FINAL_10.8.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L3S-BV6T] (expressing concerns
regarding the implementation of presumptive ADR in New York City’s Civil and Housing
Courts).
171. See, e.g., Adina L. Phillips & Samuel J. Ferrara, Mandatory Mediation Debuts at the
Mat Center This Fall, NASSAU LAW., Oct. 2019, at 9, 9; Ira S. Slavit, Presumptive ADR in
Torts and Medical Malpractice Cases, NASSAU LAW., Oct. 2019, at 10, 21 (“Participation in
presumptive ADR will be mandatory . . . .”); Changes in Kings County as to Jury Selection
and New Mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution, PILLINGER MILLER TARALLO,
https://pmtlawfirm.com/changes-in-kings-county-as-to-jury-selection-and-new-mandatoryalternative-dispute-resolution [https://perma.cc/VZ3K-CG7F] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020);
Rafal Morek, Presumptive Mediation, KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (Sept. 18, 2019),
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/09/18/presumptive-mediation
[https://
perma.cc/4AHU-GNV4] (noting that “while the Report [of the New York State ADR
Advisory Committee] does not use the term ‘mandatory mediation’, but ‘presumptive
mediation’, in some respects the concept does resemble existing schemes typically referred to
as mandatory”); NYS Courts to Implement Early Mandatory Mediation, BARCLAY DAMON
LLP (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.barclaydamon.com/alerts/nys-courts-to-implement-earlymandatory-mediation [https://perma.cc/PB7J-MUTA]; What Is Mandatory Presumptive
Divorce Mediation?, LONG ISLAND FAM. L. & MEDIATION BLOG (Nov. 10, 2019),
https://www.longislandfamilylawandmediation.com/what-is-mandatory-presumptivedivorce-mediation [https://perma.cc/C9KE-PL5C].
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1. Access to Justice and the Self-Represented Litigant
Access to justice is defined as the “ability to avail oneself of the various
institutions, governmental and non-governmental, judicial and non-judicial,
in which a claimant might pursue justice.”172 It is a foundational theme in
our society that centers “on empowering individuals to exercise their rights
in the civil justice system,”173 and it means different things to different
people.174 Traditionally, scholars have equated increased access to justice
with increased access to legal representation.175
There has been a long history of debate in the ADR field regarding ADR’s
relationship to access to justice.176 One side of the debate “critiques
mediation as impeding the access of disadvantaged groups to justice,” while
the other “values voice and autonomy in the disputing process” and
emphasizes remedies outside those present in courts.177 Despite differing
perspectives, scholars and commentators have recognized: (1) there is a
crisis in our justice system with respect to the delivery of justice; (2) there
are gaps in that system; and (3) there must be concurrent efforts to address
those gaps.178
Almost all ADR service providers recognize the right of parties to choose
self-representation in ADR proceedings.179 Since the 1970s, an increasing
number of litigants have chosen to appear unrepresented in court.180 This
surge is the result of a number of factors, the most evident being a party’s
inability to pay for a lawyer.181 The New York State Courts Access to Justice
Program reported that “efforts to document the justice gap estimate that 80%
172. See Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 115–16 (2010).
173. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 67, at 986.
174. See Price, supra note 108, at 60 (remarking that, for some, access is straightforward—
they simply hire an attorney to oversee a case—and for others it is complex—they must
traverse a complex court system without counsel’s support).
175. See Nourit Zimmerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to
Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 473–74 (2010).
176. See Ellen E. Deason et al., ADR and Access to Justice: Current Perspectives, 33 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303, 305 (2018).
177. Id.
178. See Hogarth, supra note 24, at 87. See generally Jonathan Lippman, New York’s
Template to Address the Crisis in Civil Legal Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13 (2012).
Judge Jonathan Lippman is the former chief judge of the state of New York and chief judge
of the New York Court of Appeals. He acknowledged this local and national crisis, stating
that “[t]here is a growing justice gap between the dire need for civil legal services and the
dwindling resources available.” Id. at 13.
179. See Holmes, supra note 18, at 98.
180. American courts have experienced a significant increase in the number of pro se
litigants. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987
n.1 (1999); Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 439, 441–42 (2009); Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of
Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 45–46 (2011).
181. See Landsman, supra note 180, at 443–44. Other factors include (1) an unwillingness
to pay for counsel; (2) a desire to do legal work without the assistance of counsel; and (3)
“anti-lawyer attitudes.” Id. at 444–47.
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of the civil legal needs of low-income Americans go unmet.”182 As expected,
this leads impoverished litigants to have very different experiences with
access to justice as compared to wealthy litigants.183 The wealthy tend to
hire counsel, reducing the risk that they will “mak[e] poor decisions in
mediations,”184 whereas the poor are likely to encounter “understaffed,
poorly funded public program[s] with volunteer mediators who may, or may
not, have received adequate training.”185 Moreover, as it stands, minorities
make up a disproportionate number of litigants who cannot afford a lawyer,
which means access to justice can be compromised across racial, social, and
cultural lines.
2. The Self-Represented Litigant and a Presumptive Scheme
Self-represented litigants who participate in mediation “are often
vulnerable to pressure to settle and to accept unfair results.”186 In 1991, it
took only one mediation session with a mediator-arbitrator for a 74-year-old
pro se tenant, Ms. Brockett, to agree to relinquish the apartment she lived in
for almost twenty years.187 Despite signing a settlement agreement, Ms.
Brockett refused to vacate her apartment and successfully challenged the
agreement in court.188 In part, she argued that coercion, the absence of legal
representation, and the mediator’s failure to explain her rights each played a
role.189 It is possible that a poor pro se litigant might find themselves in a
position like Ms. Brockett based on (1) presumptive mediation’s effects on
informed self-determination and (2) the resulting effects of unequal
bargaining power.190

182. N.Y. STATE COURTS ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROGRAM, WORKING TOWARD 100%
MEANINGFUL
ACCESS
TO
JUSTICE
2016,
at
i,
V
(2017),
https://
www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/ip/nya2j/pdfs/NYA2J_2016report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
KSF2-D7SS] (noting that “[e]fforts to document the justice gap estimate that 80% of the civil
legal needs of low-income Americans go unmet”).
183. See Ellen Waldman, Inequality in America and Spillover Effects on Mediation
Practice: Disputing for the 1 Per Cent and the 99 Per Cent, LAW CONTEXT, 2017, at 24, 27
(highlighting how “poorly resourced ‘one-shotters’ fare poorly as compared to more
sophisticated repeat-players”).
184. Id. at 43 (noting instead that the 1 percent tend to face a “straight-forward numbers
game” during mediation where the parties volley bottom lines until they reach a middle
ground).
185. Id. at 42–43.
186. See CTR. FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., NATIONAL
STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS § 1.4 (1999), https://
www.aboutrsi.org/library/national-standards-for-court-connected-mediation-programs
[https://perma.cc/7ZJ6-MFQA].
187. A Bronx criminal court referred this landlord-tenant dispute to a local dispute
resolution center. Wright v. Brockett, 571 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661–62 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 662.
190. In its opinion, the court noted that Ms. Brockett was not alone because the facts of the
case were “typical of the more than 100,000 actions which ha[d] been diverted from the
criminal process into alternative dispute resolution over the past 10 years.” Id. at 661.
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The principal objection against requiring mediation is that it impinges
Self-determination typically
upon parties’ self-determination.191
encompasses a voluntary decision to mediate and a voluntary decision to
come to a resolution.192 This self-determination has been argued to enhance
“the development of parties’ problem-solving capacities, their ability to craft
individualized justice on their own terms based on their own interests and
values.”193
A prominent argument against mandatory mediation is that it constitutes
coerced consent because it impinges on parties’ voluntary choice to mediate
in the first instance.194 While some ADR scholars believe that it is fair to
make parties attempt the process,195 others argue that when we do so, we
thwart self-determination and leave pro se parties at greater risk for coercion
throughout the process.196 Under this notion, “settlement rates alone cannot
be an indicator of whether coercion exists.”197
Another objection to requiring mediation for pro se litigants is that it can
result in an imbalance of power among the parties, which precludes equality
in access to justice.198 In 1984, Owen Fiss raised this concern, stating that
“settlement is . . . a function of the resources available to each party to
finance the litigation, and those resources are frequently distributed
unequally.”199 Unequal bargaining power can result in part from pro se
parties’ lack of familiarity with the mediation process200 and knowledge of
the law.201
191. See Quek, supra note 46, at 483.
192. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 18, at 69 (explaining that voluntariness is a “central
ideology and distinguishing feature of mediation”); see also Lela P. Love & John W. Cooley,
The Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators and Informed Consent: Warning the Unwary,
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 45, 53–54 (2005) (discussing the two ways informed consent
has been distinguished in mediation literature: participation consent and outcome consent).
193. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 18, at 69.
194. See Quek, supra note 46, at 490–91; see also Lee, supra note 123 (quoting a
commercial mediator who called it “coerced mediation”). Coercion has been defined in two
subcategories: coercion into mediation and coercion within the mediation process. See Quek,
supra note 46, at 485–86; see also Bullock & Gallagher, supra note 43, at 948 (discussing
coercion with respect to settlement agreements).
195. See Frank E. A. Sander, H. William Allen & Debra R. Hensler, Judicial (Mis)use of
ADR?: A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 885, 886 (1996) (claiming that this does not force parties
to settle so it does not constitute coercion).
196. See Quek, supra note 46, at 491 (stating that coercion into mediation “will then readily
lead to parties sensing that they are being coerced within the mediation process”); see also
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 47, 60–62 (1996).
197. Quek, supra note 46, at 487 (outlining the conflicting results of a number of empirical
studies on settlement rates in mandatory and voluntary mediation).
198. See Hogarth, supra note 24, at 87 (arguing that every person should be afforded a
lawyer to assist him or her to ensure equality in access to justice).
199. See Fiss, supra note 70, at 1076. Fiss noted that one critical problem underlying ADR
is that it “implicitly asks us to assume a rough equality between the contending parties.” Id.
200. See infra notes 202–07.
201. See infra notes 207–09. Power differentials can also manifest when a pro se party is
facing a “repeat player,” like a landlord, represented by legal counsel. See Robert Rubinson,
Indigency, Secrecy, and Questions of Quality: Minimizing the Risk of “Bad” Mediation for
Low-Income Litigants, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1353, 1369 (2017). Repeat players can “maximize
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There is a lack of public awareness of the mediation field, its process, and
its benefits.202 With respect to low-income litigants in particular, a large
percentage know nothing about mediation.203 Even though mediators are
required to promote informed decision-making throughout the mediation,204
ADR scholar Ellen Waldman argues that the focus tends to be on explaining
the procedural mechanics of the mediation process.205 She says that “we
gloss over what it is [that pro se parties] need to understand about the
substantive decisions they are making,” which inhibits their access to
justice.206
Lack of proficiency regarding legal matters also puts pro se parties at a
disadvantage because the law is an important tool in the settlement
process.207 Indigent pro se individuals are particularly at risk given that they
often take cases to court without a lawyer and do so “with little or no
knowledge of the law or the legal nature of their claim.”208
In instances where one participant has more resources, the mediation
process becomes unfair.209 The power imbalance “invariably infect[s] the
bargaining process,” and pro se litigants’ access to justice is compromised.210
Today, lawyers are controlling mediation sessions,211 which puts pro se
long-term gain in litigation by developing advance intelligence, planning for future
engagement, developing trust and legitimacy with court personnel and, playing for favourable
rule development.” Waldman, supra note 182, at 27 n.22 (citing Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 95, 98–103 (1974)).
202. See Alyson Carrel & Noam Ebner, Mind the Gap: Bringing Technology to the
Mediation Table, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 43 (suggesting that technology could enhance
mediation’s process and outcome).
203. See Rubinson, supra note 201, at 1355.
204. See Michael T. Colatrella Jr., Informed Consent in Mediation: Promoting Pro Se
Parties’ Informed Settlement Choice While Honoring the Mediator’s Ethical Duties, 15
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 705, 705 (2014); Deason et al., supra note 176, at 318.
205. See Deason et al., supra note 176, at 319.
206. Id. Generally, ethical codes allow mediators to provide legal information but not legal
advice. Since it is difficult for mediators to distinguish the two, Waldman argues that
mediators often avoid conversations with pro se litigants “that might place them at odds with
state regulatory structures as well as unauthorised practice prohibitions.” Waldman, supra note
182, at 37.
207. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 196, at 65–66 (noting that legal rights are, in part, a
matter of bargaining in the mediation process, so parties should have knowledge of the law).
208. See Hogarth, supra note 24, at 87.
209. See Robert Rubinson, Stories of Experience: Economic Inequality in Mediation, 70
S.C. L. REV. 85, 101 (2018).
210. See Fiss, supra note 70, at 1076 (“[T]he settlement will be at odds with a conception
of justice that seeks to make the wealth of the parties irrelevant.”). Fiss outlines three ways a
disparity in resources can influence settlement: (1) the poorer party may not be as able to
gather and examine data needed to forecast the outcome; (2) the poorer party may be induced
to settle because they need money as soon as possible, even though they realize they might
get less now than if they waited; and (3) the poorer party might be forced to settle because
they do not have resources to finance the litigation. Id.
211. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 18, at 63 (noting that lawyers are employing adversarial
posturing “in the name of zealous advocacy”); see also KOVACH, supra note 20, at 165 (noting
that some lawyers utilize competitive or adversarial styles even though advocacy in mediation
is premised on a nonadversarial approach).
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parties at risk.212 Without a lawyer, these individuals can only rely on
mediators to help alleviate some inequality through their duties to promote
informed decision-making.213 But since mediators cannot provide pro se
individuals any legal advice, self-represented parties are left “to make
decisions in an informational vacuum,” which can lead to conversations “not
in the parties’ long-term best interests.”214 Although mediators must also
maintain neutrality, it is unclear what responsibility they have, if any, to
balance power differentials.215
III. A UNIFORM OPT-OUT PROVISION
The lack of self-determination and likelihood of unequal bargaining power
that can result when parties are required to mediate support the conclusion
that pro se litigants may be severely disadvantaged by a presumptive
mediation model. Despite the state court initiative’s forward-thinking
agenda, mediation still occurs largely in the dark.216 Since “[a]ccess to
justice is not a luxury, affordable only in good times,”217 this Part proposes
that the judiciary adopt a six-factor test to determine whether pro se parties
should be exempt from presumptive mediation at the onset of a case.
The six factors to be considered derive from the seminal 2004 English
court case Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust.218 The defendant
refused to take a dispute to mediation.219 In its holding, the Halsey court
acknowledged that ADR processes can have their advantages and
disadvantages and noted that “they are not appropriate for every case.”220
The court then outlined the following factors to be considered when assessing
whether a party has unreasonably refused ADR:
(a) the nature of the dispute; (b) the merits of the case; (c) the extent to
which other settlement methods have been attempted; (d) whether the costs
of the ADR would be disproportionately high; (e) whether any delay in

212. See Rubinson, supra note 201, at 1373.
213. See generally Colatrella, supra note 204 (discussing the debate regarding the nature
of mediator duties and how they should be discharged).
214. See Waldman, supra note 182, at 36–37, 43. Waldman agrees with prominent access
to justice scholar Russell Engler, who said that court-connected mediators’ duties should
change when disputants are unrepresented because it is not a fair or impartial system if
represented parties routinely win. Id.
215. See Rubinson, supra note 209, at 101; see also Bernie Mayer, Mediation: 50 Years
of Creative Conflict, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 34, 36 (2013). For a general overview on the debate
regarding how responsible mediators are for the results of a mediation, see Lawrence
Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 46–47
(1981) (arguing that mediators are obligated to ensure just, stable, and fair negotiated
agreements) and Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to
Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 107–09 (1981) (asserting that mediators do not have an
obligation to contribute to socially desirable outcomes because it would undermine their
neutrality).
216. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
217. Lippman, supra note 178, at 19.
218. See generally [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576 (Eng.).
219. See id. [3].
220. See id. [16].
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setting up and attending the ADR would have been prejudicial; and (f)
whether the ADR had a reasonable prospect of success.221

A blanket exemption for pro se litigants, similar to those which were
adopted in the Northern District of New York and as part of the pilot project
for state court commercial cases, would certainly address some of these
concerns.222 However, there may be certain contexts where mediation is
appropriate for pro se litigants.223 Therefore, there exists a legitimate
concern that pro se litigants may never choose to opt in to mediation under
that scheme.224 To balance these factors, these six considerations would
prevent cases from arbitrary referral absent any examination of their specific
circumstances.
In practice, a pro se litigant would request to opt out of presumptive
mediation.225 One example of how this could work would follow the
Western District’s model, where the court would then grant the motion only
on a showing of “good cause.”226 A judge would consider good cause within
the context of these six factors and the pro se litigant’s adversary would be
allowed to make a showing that the pro se party was being unreasonable in
their refusal to attempt presumptive mediation. For example, if the pro se
litigant claims that mediation has no reasonable prospect of success, the
court, like the one in Halsey, would place the burden on the adversary to
show that there was a reasonable prospect that mediation would be
successful.227 This scheme would effectively balance “the need for the
courts to freely direct cases to mediation” with the “need for the parties to
request for exemption due to exceptional circumstances.”228 Additionally,
specific exemption criteria that require the courts to conduct a holistic review
will result in a more balanced application of ADR processes.229
221. See id. The court held that it has no power to compel parties to enter into mediation
against their will because “to oblige truly unwilling parties . . . would be to impose an
unacceptable obstruction on their right of access to the court,” a right guaranteed under article
6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Id. [9].
222. See supra notes 99, 128 and accompanying text. An inequitable result could arise
from only one mediation session between a pro se litigant and a represented party. See supra
Part II.
223. See supra Part I.A (discussing the general advantages of mediation and situations
where parties benefit from the process).
224. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
225. See Quek, supra note 46, at 491 (“Categorical referral very readily leads to coercion
unless parties are allowed to request an exemption from mediation.”).
226. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
227. See Halsey v. Milton Keynes Gen. NHS Tr. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576 [28] (Eng.).
228. See Quek, supra note 46, at 500.
229. See id. at 508 (warning that criteria for opt-out provisions should not be “couched in
vague terms” or “set at too lenient a standard”). Quek critiques Halsey’s six factors, noting
that it is difficult for a court to accurately assess whether a party has unreasonably refused
mediation. Id. at 503–04. Quek then supports a model used in court-connected ADR programs
in Florida because it allows parties to choose their mediators, file grievance complaints against
mediators, and outlines clear requirements regarding obligations to mediate. Id. at 505–07.
While Quek’s concerns are warranted, the Florida measures are not enough to redress the loss
of self-determination that parties experience when they are mandated to mediate. Moreover,
a repeat player might have the upper hand in choosing a mediator or pro se parties might lack
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This criteria should be adopted as part of the uniform state rules, not as
part of the guidelines and protocols each local jurisdiction will develop.230
To maintain the efficacy and legitimacy of presumptive mediation, it is
imperative that one standard is enforced and reaffirmed across the state’s
sixty-two counties.
In addition to this six-factor test, the New York State courts should take
another page from the federal system’s book and expand their limited-scope
pro bono representation for pro se litigants whose cases are subject to
presumptive mediation.231 Under this scheme, pro se litigants must decide
whether or not to proceed with mediation in the first instance. If they decide
they want to opt out, they will then have to convince the requisite body.
Thus, limited-scope representation is critical because, as evidenced, pro se
litigants are typically not familiar with either mediation’s procedural or
substantive components.232
Currently, the judiciary offers limited-scope representation to litigants in
family, divorce, consumer credit, and landlord-tenant cases through its New
Expanding this
York State Courts Access to Justice Program.233
representation to all civil cases subject to presumptive mediation would allow
lawyers to provide discrete services when the pro se client is aware of, or has
requested, limited service offerings.
Chief Judge DiFiore rightfully acknowledged that “the delivery of justice
in the state courts must continually evolve and improve to keep pace with the
needs of our modern society.”234 The judiciary’s implementation of
presumptive mediation across New York State is a powerful and significant
step in the right direction. However, the adoption of uniform opt-out criteria
and the expansion of limited-scope representation will enable that measure
to better address the needs of those most vulnerable in our society. By
placing substantive justice at the forefront of system design, these
recommendations would more fully address the systemic problems pro se
litigants face while negotiating with represented parties and hopefully help
prevent parties from settling “while leaving justice undone.”235
CONCLUSION
To date, the New York State court system has not established uniform rules
with respect to pro se litigants and presumptive mediation. Without uniform
rules, it has left the door open for jurisdictions across the state to devise their
the knowledge to assess mediator quality. Thus, the unequal bargaining power typically
present in mediations with pro se parties could thwart any benefit derived from letting parties
choose their own mediators or file grievance complaints.
230. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
231. See Hogarth, supra note 24, at 88.
232. See supra Part II.B.
233. See New York State Courts Access to Justice Program, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS.,
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/ip/nya2j/ourwork.shtml [https://perma.cc/8YCC-43FZ] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2020).
234. See DiFiore, supra note 19, at 1055.
235. See Fiss, supra note 70, at 1085.
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own, potentially dissimilar, standards. The goal of the U.S. legal system is
to obtain justice through law, empowering participants first before turning to
concerns like docket control. Parties, pro se and otherwise, deserve equal
access to justice. They deserve to have their day in court. To prevent this
transformative measure from just becoming another tool of mass justice, this
Note advocates that the judiciary adopt a six-factor test to be considered
when deciding whether pro se litigants should be required to mediate civil
suits at the onset of a case.

